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This thesis analyzes 2,700 verbal transmissions collected from an audio tap on
DDG 51's CIC internal communication network during the ship's OPEVAL. The
frequency and duration of these voice transmissions are analyzed to explore for
systematic changes. These changes are associated with different workload levels and the
levels of stress induced by eight simulated combat scenarios. The data shows that CIC
team member communication patterns varied as a function of workload. The use of
verbal communication patterns as unobtrusive, noninvasive measures of workload in
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Communication is the act of sharing information. This thesis is about human
communication, but human communication in a very narrow, restricted, and unique
sense. It is about how members of a Combat Information Center team aboard the lead
ship of a new class of United States Navy guided-missile destroyers, the ARLEIGH
BURKE (DDG 51), shared information during their ship's Congressionally mandated
operational evaluation. It is about information shared by crewmen as they attempted to
thwart raids by very realistic and challenging threats to demonstrate their ship's ability
to fight. It is about communication - how information is shared - in a simulated combat
environment; an environment characterized by high costs, high stakes, high drama, and
high workload. From a methodological perspective, this thesis is about using natural
human communication patterns as unobtrusive, noninvasive indices of workload. This
introduction will consider five broad themes.
• First. Modern surface combat systems have become increasingly lethal and at the
same time, increasingly complex. Complexity usually increases operator
workload, increases which typically require distributing that workload across many
skilled operators. It is those operators who ultimately must communicate with each
other to accomplish a mission.
• Second. The AEGIS combat system exemplifies such a system. It is highly
complex, very lethal, and manned by a diversified crew whose training,
background, and rank all differ. However, the crew needs to share information -
communicate - during critical, and in some cases life-threatening, high workload
evolutions.
• Third. There may be substantive changes in this shared behavior - communication
- among team members during high-workload evolutions. These changes may be
systematic alterations in the frequency and duration of verbal transmissions. If
these changes, or communication patterns, can be quantified and set within a
proper theoretical context, they could be used as unobtrusive, noninvasive measures
of workload and stress.
• Fourth. The Operational Test and Evaluation (OPEVAL) of USS ARLEIGH
BURKE (DDG 51) presented an opportunity to examine human communication
patterns under different levels of workload.
• Fifth. If high workload systematically alters a team's communication patterns,
then those patterns should be accounted for by current models and findings from
the study of human information processing.
A. INCREASING SYSTEM COMPLEXITY
The effort to stay in control of technology becomes more difficult
all the time. No one, no thing, has ever been perfect, but the
price of error is higher than ever before. For hundreds of
millennia in the prehistoric past, individuals defended their own
land and built their own shelters. Settlements were far apart;
accidents affected relatively few people. Today, living close
together in complex social networks, we may become victims of
other people's mistakes - on the positive side, we owe our survival
to reliable strangers. We depend more and more on a rare breed
of specialists trained to hold the line against chaos. They make
their share of mistakes. But they strive to develop ways of
catching error early and preventing it from blossoming into
catastrophe. (Pfeiffer, 1989, p. 39)
Simply stated, system complexity has narrowed the margin for error, has made the need
for good design more crucial, and has made the consequences of error potentially more
catastrophic.
Military research and development has undoubtedly advanced American commercial
and industrial technologies (Binkin, 1986, p. 3). In 1986 alone, for example, the
Department of Defense expended fifteen times the research and development (R&D)
funds than did France, Germany, or Britain and 80 times that of Japan (Packard
Commission, 1989, p. 3). These R&D expenditures have produced increasingly
complex, albeit lethal, military systems, which in turn, have increased the need to
consider human factors during system design. In fact, the interface between the operator
and the machine in modern combat systems can be a critical and limiting factor in system
performance.
Increased complexity not only substantiates the need for proper weapon system
design, it has driven the need to consider other aspects of human factors; that is, the
accompanying manpower, personnel, and training systems needed to accommodate more
complicated and sophisticated human performance requirements. A quick historical
survey of the number of specialized skills required to fight a ship reflects this trend. In
1805, Nelson's Fleet at Trafalgar, had only four ratings: able-bodied seaman, less than
able-bodied seaman, carpenter, and marine. In 1916, Britain's WWI Navy at Jutland had
twelve ratings (Keegan, 1987, pp. 65-66). Today, the U.S. Navy has 112 ratings and
1409 Naval Enlisted Classifications or subspecialties. The evolutionary increases in
combat system complexity are clearly reflected in the distribution of labor needed to
operate and maintain them.
B. AEGIS: AN EXAMPLE OF INCREASED COMPLEXITY
The most recent example of a complex system in today's Navy is the AEGIS
weapon system aboard the billion dollar TICONDEROGA class missile cruisers and the
new ARLEIGH BURKE class missile destroyers. The AEGIS concept is, from a
technical perspective, a quantum leap from older systems. The AEGIS weapon system
affords its ships the world's most capable anti-air warfare (AAW) capability. The system
was designed and developed to provide carrier battlegroups defense against aircraft and
anti-ship missiles (Polmar, 1987, p. 113).
1. The AEGIS System
The AEGIS weapon system is a sophisticated computer-aided data processing,
analysis, and display system, designed to handle coordinated Soviet air and missile
saturation attacks. Its centerpiece is the AN/SPY- 1A phased arrayed radar; a radar that
can simultaneously search and track hundreds of air and surface targets. AEGIS is to
the Navy as the Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AWACs) is to the Air Force: an all
seeing eye. There is, however, a significant difference between the two systems. While
the sole function of AWACs is to acquire and transmit data to ground control stations,
AEGIS is an independent weapons platform as well. It not only detects and classifies
hostile targets, it can destroy them. (Allard, 1990, p. 163)
AEGIS equipped cruisers and destroyers protect carrier battle groups (CVBGs)
by detecting, classifying, and tracking hundreds of targets simultaneously; in the air, on
the surface and under the sea. They also bring additional offensive power to the CVBG
in missiles and guns. Vessels equipped with the AEGIS system destroy attackers by
using a variety of weapons including ship and air-launched torpedoes, anti-submarine
rockets, deck guns, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and rapid fire
PHALANX close-in weapon systems, all aided by electronic jammers and decoys. The
variety of missions includes anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-ship, and strike warfare,
including bombardment of shore positions. (CG 47 Class Services, Naval Sea Systems
Command, 1987, p. 1-13)
In 1985, Vice Admiral H.C. Mustin, then commander of the Second Fleet,
summarized the importance of the AEGIS weapon system. He stated:
AEGIS has brought clarity to the air battle. ... the importance of our new ability
to put the surface-to-air-missile ships in the outer defense zone, where they can
shoot approaching bombers before they reach missile launch range, cannot be
overstated. ... with AEGIS, we can win the air battle against all comers.
Without AEGIS, we cannot win. (Allard, 1990, p. 163)
2. The VINCENNES Incident
The AEGIS weapon system achieved notoriety during the 1988 Iran/Iraq war,
when the USS VINCENNES shot down an Iranian Airbus A300, Iran Air Flight 655,
with 290 passengers aboard. It took seven minutes to shoot down Flight 655, but
subsequent investigations by the Navy, Congress, and international organizations lasted
six months (Hill, 1989, p. 108). Investigations continue. Recent accusations by
Newsweek and Nightline, for example, have renewed interest in the VINCENNES
incident and Congressional hearings are being held to determine the validity of the
original reports (Newsweek, July, 13 1992, pp. 28-39).
Independent psychologists who reviewed the VINCENNES incident testified before
the House Armed Services Committee in October 1988. They testified that the stress of
combat, heightened workload due to information overload, and a communications
breakdown in the ship's Combat Information Center (CIC) contributed to the tragedy
(Squires, 1988, p. A3). The Navy's investigative team, headed by Rear Admiral
William Fogarty, drew similar conclusions:
Since it appears that combat induced stress on personnel may have played a
significant role in this incident, it is recommended the CNO direct further study be
undertaken into the stress factors impacting on personnel in modern warships with
highly sophisticated command, control, communications, and intelligence systems,
such as AEGIS. This study should also address the possibility of establishing a
psychological profile for personnel who must function in this environment. It is
also suggested that the CNO consider instituting a program for Command, Control,
Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) stress management to test and evaluate the
impact of human stress on C3I operations in complex warships such as the AEGIS
cruiser. Integral to this program would be the incorporation of measures of human
effectiveness into battle simulation techniques to assess the effect of peak overloads
and stress on human players. (CNO Memorandum Ser 11B1/14-89, 1989, p. 3)
The system hardware was vindicated by the Navy investigation as working exactly as
designed and the investigation concluded that human error had caused the tragic loss of
life. Questions then surfaced as to the cause of the human error; something not so easily
explained or understood.
C. WORKLOAD AND STRESS
1. Stress
For the purpose of this paper, stress is defined as:
A loading, a burden, a pressure on the individual, which may come from
physical or psychological sources. For practical purposes, a stressor can be
considered any condition that taxes a person's resources or threatens his well-
being (McGrath, 1989, pp. 1-2).
The dangers of combat are well known, but more subtle impacts induced by high ambient
noise, crowding, heat, fatigue, lack of sleep, high workload, anxiety, and competition
are more obscure. Figure 1 shows a conceptual breakdown of general stress as induced
Figure 1. Stressors
by a broad range of stressors. (Poock and Martin, 1984, p. 1-3). It is clear that stress,
as defined above, can be induced by a variety of conditions, including increased
information processing wrought by high levels of cognitive workload.
The relationship between levels of stress and human performance measures,
such as accuracy of response and speed of response, is not linear. Instead, the
relationship takes the form of the inverted-U depicted in Figure 2. This function is
called the Yerkes-Dodson Law. It holds that performance is not always adversely
impacted by stress. In fact, as reflected by the shape of the curve, optimal performance
is actually achieved in the presence of stress. However, both too much and too little
stress adversely impact performance, especially at the extreme regions, the tails, of the
inverted-U. Performance is assumed to be affected by the extent to which the stressor
activates the central nervous system. High central nervous system activation induces
high arousal. Low activation induces low arousal. Different performance decrements
are associated with different levels of arousal. (McGrath, 1989, p. 7)
The Yerkes-Dodson Law bears on two important considerations concerning
human performance, especially as it relates to task difficulty and high arousal stress.
First, the optimum level of stress ... is inversely related to the difficulty of
the task. In other words, the optimum level shifts downward for difficult
tasks and upward for easy tasks. The more difficult the task, the more
sensitive it will be to the effects of high arousal stress. Performance in CIC
can get the worst of this effect, because under the conditions that produce
high arousal, the tasks become more difficult. ...The second point, is that the
effects of stress are not necessarily bad. Stress can, and does, improve
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Figure 2. Yerkes-Dodson Law
Naval operations typically occur at the low end of the arousal spectrum, with
occasional periods of extremely high arousal levels induced by abrupt changes in the
environment. This condition is accurately captured by a popular anonymous aphorism;
"Standing a watch in CIC is hours of boredom punctuated by moments of shear terror."
Because this thesis focused on CIC team members performing tasks in a simulated
combat environment, the remainder of this section discusses the causes and effects of
high arousal stress.
2. Causes of High Arousal Stress
Figure 1 showed a list of stressors which span the spectrum from low to high
arousal stress. The most typical causes of high arousal stress are high anxiety, high
workload, and adverse environmental conditions. Each of these stressors can have its
own unique effects on performance, but as a group, they all increase the arousal level;
that is, they induce relatively high levels of central nervous system activation. (McGrath,
1989, pp. 7-11)
High arousal stressors typically manifest themselves in three ways. First, they
induce a feeling of frustration or a distinct sense of arousal. Second, they stimulate
physiological changes; for example, an increase in heart rate, heightened blood pressure,
faster respiration, and higher core body temperature. Third, and a particularly important
effect from this paper's perspective, high arousal stressors affect the efficiency with
which people process information. (Wickens, 1992, p. 412)
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3. Effects of High Arousal Stress
The most significant cognitive effects associated with high arousal stress are
(a) attentional narrowing, (b) short term memory loss, (c) activation, and (d)
communication degradation. These effects are discussed below.
a. Attentional Narrowing
Attentional narrowing refers to a sharp constriction of a person's field
or range of attention under conditions of high central nervous system activation; that is,
during states of high arousal. High arousal stress increases alertness and musters
attentional resources, but at the same time, attention becomes very narrowly focused
(McGrath, 1989, p. 12). Attention tends to be focused centrally at the expense of
"paying attention" to events at the periphery of the problem space. This narrowing is
analogous to viewing the contents of a room through the keyhole of its door.
Attentional narrowing has important implications for a person who must
perform more than one task at a time. There is evidence which indicates that if a person
has to simultaneously perform more than one task, for example, tracking a cursor on a
display while communicating, then performance on the secondary or subsidiary task (in
this example, communicating) may deteriorate in high workload situations. Deterioration
can be expected in manual dexterity, sensory-motor tasks, and performance of the
secondary tasks in general. (Hockey, 1983, p. 137) This "tunnel vision," which
essentially reflects a highly focused attentional field, is not manifest at the sensory level.
Its impact is central. It affects the central cognitive processes. (McGrath, 1989, pp. 13-
14)
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b. Short Term Memory Loss
The human memory system is typically conceptualized as having three
stages. The first stage temporarily stores information at the sensory level; for example,
information can be stored at the visual or auditory level. Sensory storage lasts for about
a quarter of a second and requires no effort to retain it. Short term memory, also called
"working memory," is the second memory stage and occurs between information stored
at the sensory level and information stored in long term memory, the third stage in the
process. Information cannot pass from short term memory into long term memory
without applying considerable effort; that is, a person must "pay attention" to the
information in short term memory or "rehearse" it, if it is to be retained in long term
memory. Without rehearsing the information in short term memory, it fades and is
quickly lost, usually in under twenty seconds (Wickens, 1992, p. 220). Short term
memory is adversely affected by high arousal stress. This impact probably stems from
environmental conditions, such as the rate with which information is flowing or its shear
volume. Information overload can effectively block a person's ability to rehearse
information temporarily held in the short term memory register. In the present case,
high workload situations in CIC during combat situations prevents rehearsal. Unless
written down, such as with a grease pencil on a display screen, discrete point estimations
of tactical data quickly fade from memory.
During high arousal situations, information is usually not committed to
long term memory. Most of it fades from short term memory in roughly twenty
seconds. Given that, operators must frequently refresh their short term memory stores.
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Two examples in which instrumentation is used to compensate for these memory deficits
are (a) instrumented ranges that record performance during high workload air combat
maneuvering exercises and (b) inport training evolutions that systematically record all
team performance.
c. Activation
Activation is the tendency of high arousal stress to rapidly instigate action
with little or no consideration for the consequences of the action. Under conditions of
high arousal, operators have the desire to "do something" quickly, even though it may
not be prudent. Responsiveness or reaction times will be quicker, but more mistakes will
be made. (Wickens, 1992, p. 419)
d. Communication Degradation
Individuals usually become less communicative and are less willing to
pass detailed information in high arousal conditions. Misunderstandings between team
members tend to occur more frequently due to attentional narrowing and the demands
placed on short term memory stores. (McGrath, 1989, p. 14) Studies have also shown
that there are quantitative changes in verbal communications patterns produced under
stress compared to normal, non-stressed communication (Hicks, 1979, pp. 124-125).
Communication patterns refer to changes in the duration and frequency of verbal
transmissions, not their content. These changes, which will be discussed in greater detail
later, occur if the level of arousal exceeds a certain threshold.
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4. Measurement of Stress: Issues
Three major issues often arise in non-laboratory attempts to measure the
impact of stress on human operators in the Navy. They are (a) the acceptability of
certain measurement techniques to the operational chain of command, (b) the
generalizability of findings produced by laboratory based experimental procedures, and
(c) the obtrusiveness of the data collection itself.
a. Acceptability to the Chain of Command
Evaluating the impact of operator stress on mission performance is a
controversial issue within the operational chain of command. Many of today's military
leaders recognize the potentially catastrophic consequences of stress. Some, however,
reasonably believe that combat stress cannot be simulated without the threat of mortal
danger and yet remain within acceptable safety and budgetary limits. This position is
exemplified in the following Congressional testimony by the Director of the Department
of Defense Office of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Operational tests are run in the most realistic combat conditions possible, consistent
with safety and available test resources. It is unlikely that an operational test can
be devised that can put operators under stresses identical to combat and still meet
the requirements of safety. It would be of little value and would probably be
unsafe to run an operational test of a weapons system so as to cause operators to
"distort data" or suffer from "task fixation." Tests when an operator is not acting
rationally, will not provide pertinent information on which to judge the
effectiveness of the system. (Congressional Record, H.A.S.C. No. 100-94,
September 14, 1988, p. 157)
Despite limitations imposed by safety and budget constraints, testing
today's billion dollar surface combatants requires a level of realism necessary to ensure
the tests' findings are indeed valid. This realism is part of the test and evaluation
14
procedure, and it is precisely this realism that induces high workloads on the crew.
Given that workload has become an important aspect of the OPEVAL, it must somehow
be measured and made part of the comprehensive system evaluation and its subsequent
report.
b. Generalizability of Findings
The results from studies of stress which incorporate laboratory induced
stress do not fully generalize to real world situations (Hicks, 1979, p. 110). When
dealing with a CIC team at sea, evaluating the impact of increased workload places
extraordinary methodological demands on the researcher and irregular scheduling
demands on the operational unit. These demands are extraordinary because it is difficult,
if not impossible, to control all the intervening variables in an operational environment.
It is also difficult to completely control the schedules of the operators. Results from such
experiments, typically produce findings that are either unreliable or cannot readily
generalize beyond the immediate test session or test environment.
c. Obtrusiveness of Data Collection
Physiological methods used to measure stress are typically obtrusive and
occasionally invasive; for example, rectal thermometers were recently used to measure
core body temperature of sailors aboard ships in the Persian Gulf. The interruption,
discomfort, or the simple presence of data collection equipment may bias the data by
simply altering routine behavior. Alternatively, psychological techniques used to
measure workload usually cannot be administered during actual operations; hence, data,
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especially survey data, is usually collected after the fact. Unobtrusive, noninvasive
measures of workload would satisfy an operator's desire to remain unencumbered by
extraneous and alien data collection requirements and a researchers desire to collect
accurate and reliable data.
D. OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION OF DDG 51
During the October 1988 House Armed Services Committee inquiry into the
VINCENNES incident, the Life Science Director of the Cognitive and Neural Sciences
Division in the Office of Naval Research reported that the Navy spends about $30 million
a year on human performance research. He also reported that his office had actively
been investigating this area for forty years (Squires, 1988, p. A3). Despite the
considerable investment in time and money, the Office of Naval Technology started an
exploratory development program called Tactical Decision Making Under Stress
(TADMUS) in 1989.
The objective of the TADMUS program is to apply recent developments in decision
theory, individual and team training, and information display to the problem of
enhancing tactical decision quality under conditions of stress. This will be
accomplished by a cooperative program in human factors and training technology.
(Office of Naval Technology, 1991, p. 1)
During the same time period, the Navy was faced with criticism on its test and
evaluation procedures of AEGIS. The criticism centered on reports that the quantity,
realism, and difficulty of scenarios used to test AEGIS were inadequate. (Allard, 1990,
p. 163)
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) replied to the criticism by citing that "more
testing had been done on the AEGIS weapon system than on any other system to date"
(Trost, 1988, p. A21). He further defended AEGIS by explaining the testing procedures
used:
In the Navy, the command primarily charged with the responsibility for testing our
weapons systems is the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR).
This command is headed by a two-star admiral who reports directly to me and the
Secretary of the Navy. In fact, many of the systems it tests do not qualify for
placement in the fleet. OPTEVFOR tries to defeat new systems by challenging
them with known threats - and anticipated future threats - in order to ensure that
fleet operators make the systems perform properly (Trost, 1988, p. A21).
In 1991, CNO tasked Commander OPTEVFOR (COMOPTEVFOR) to incorporate
TADMUS testing into the operational evaluation (OPEVAL) of ARLFJGH BURKE
(DDG 51) (Kren, 7 July 1992).
In November 1991, OPTEVFOR enlisted the assistance of Naval Command,
Control, Ocean Surveillance Center's RDT&E Division (NRaD) to identify methods to
assess the stress experienced by DDG 51 crew members and to do so with as little
interference on operations as possible. The measures were to be unobtrusive and
noninvasive (COMOPTEVFOR Memorandum of Agreement, 1991, p. 3). The following
three methods were chosen by NRaD and agreed upon by COMOPTEVFOR (NRaD,
1992. p. 1).
• Subjective workload assessments from CIC watchstanders.
• Subjective assessments of performance pressure by experts observing video and
audio tape recordings of the CIC team.
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• Objective measurements of workload using the War Diaries; that is, data
reconstructed from AEGIS' s computers.
These three data collection methods were used during DDG 5 1 OPEVAL to provide a
basis for NRaD to report on the levels of stress present during the simulated combat
scenarios. The data to support the present study's focus on communication patterns, a
dimension considered but not implemented by NRaD, was extracted from the audio tape
recordings of the CIC team.
E. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS AS INDICES OF WORKLOAD
Communication patterns; again, changes in the frequency and duration of verbal
transmissions, may be used as indices of workload pending empirical validation.
Workload, stress, and ineffective communication have been implicated as causative
factors in many accidents involving complex systems. Very few studies, however, have
focused on communication patterns during periods of increased workload. The analysis
presented in this thesis centers on exploring for distinct changes in communication
patterns among CIC team members during various levels of workload imposed by
realistic operational scenarios. This analysis will search for quantitative differences in
frequency and duration of communications as a function of increasing workload.
The importance of these measures is that the data collection method is completely
unobtrusive and noninvasive. The method described in this thesis requires little more
than a line tap on the internal communications circuit, which when undisclosed to its
users, eliminates performance biases from operators. If these methods are validated, they
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will provide the Navy with an unobtrusive, inexpensive, uncomplicated, and rapid means
of evaluating the impact of workload on a CIC team. Moreover, temporal analysis of
CIC team communication patterns can serve as a basis for the development of more
realistic team trainers to study workload effects on team performance.
1. Predicted Findings
The following predictions are based on the findings associated with high
arousal stress's impact on information processing.
• The average time of a verbal transmission by a CIC team member will decrease as
levels of workload increase.
• The frequency of verbal transmissions will increase as levels of workload increase.
• The magnitude of the dependent variables identified above - average time and
frequency of transmission - will covary with changes in the level of workload.
The following chapter describes the method by which the communication data were
collected and analyzed to test the validity of these predictions.
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H. METHOD
This analysis sought to compare and contrast speech patterns produced by a CIC
team while performing their duties under different levels of workload. This section
describes the method by which the analysis was conducted. There are four parts. The
first part describes how the CIC team was exposed to different levels of workload
induced by different simulated combat scenarios. The second part discusses the
quantitative indices used to analyze human communication patterns. The third part
describes the techniques used to collect voice data from CIC during simulated combat.
The fourth and final part describes the statistical approach used to treat the data and test
hypotheses.
A. RAIDS
The USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) underwent OPEVAL during the January-
February 1992 time frame. There were three levels of workload imposed by three
different simulated combat scenarios or "raids" launched against DDG 51 during its
OPEVAL. The three raid levels were named NO-RAID, MANNED-RAID, and
MISSILE-RAID. These three raids levels, which will be referred to as "Composite
Raids" throughout this thesis, were comprised of eight different exercises. The eight
exercises that comprised the three Composite Raids will be referred to as "Component
Raids."
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COMOPTEVFOR's schedule of events (SOE) was developed to support testing the
ship's systems by presenting varying threat profile densities and formats to exercise the
full capacity of shipboard combat systems. The SOE also determined which test events
could be recorded for subsequent workload analysis. Following pre-trial examination of
OPTEVFOR's test plan, NRaD, the agency responsible to OPTEVFOR for stress
analysis, identified segments of the test events which were classified as high activity anti-
air warfare (AAW) scenarios. NRaD also identified relatively low activity periods for
comparative baseline assessments. (NRaD, 1992, p. 4)
The high activity exercises selected included two broad categories of assaults; that
is, manned aerial raids and anti-ship missile raids. Three manned aerial raids (MR-3,
MR-11, and MR- 12) were launched against DDG 51 on 17 January 1992. A fourth
manned aerial raid of significantly greater proportions than the three preceding raids was
launched 3 February 1992. This large stream raid, dubbed MR-MAX, tested DDG 51 's
ability to handle anticipated aerial saturation attacks. The final two high activity
exercises involved live missile firings against simulated anti-ship missile drones. These
two missile raids, designated MF-4E and MF-7, were executed 31 January and 2
February 1992, respectively. (NRaD, 1992, p. 4)
The relatively low periods of activity used for baseline comparisons were two
periods, both on 17 January 1992. These two periods, termed NO-RAJD-l and NO-
RAID-2, were selected because they were similar to normal underway operations.
(NRaD, 1992, p. 5)
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During early OPEVAL events (MR-3, MR-11, and MR- 12), weapon engagements
were simulated; that is, the CIC team would rehearse the firing sequence but not actually
release a missile. The SOE indicated there would be medium to high density multi-
warfare threats, with the possibility of commercial and friendly forces mixed with the
threat. This combination of factors produced the potential for high track density and
increased workload. (NRaD, 1992, pp. 4-5)
Events in the later stages of the OPEVAL included live firing events (MF-4E and
MR-7), together with a simulated maximum density manned raid (MR-MAX) of
approximately 50 aircraft (NRaD, 1992, pp. 4-5). The Composite Raids, which were
comprised of these Component Raids, are briefly described below.
1. NO-RAID
Two relatively low activity periods were considered baseline workload levels.
These periods were called NO-RAID- 1 and NO-RAID-2. They were free from any
scheduled air activity and considered transit time for the ship by the SOE. These
conditions provided data from what was considered a "normal watch" while the ship
steamed independently. As such, they represent baseline activity levels.
2. MANNED-RAID
The second workload category consisted of four manned aircraft raids of
varying intensity; MR-3, MR-11, MR-12, AND MR-MAX. All engagements were
simulated and typified scenarios presented during inport training exercises in team
trainers. There were, however, differences during the OPEVAL that would add to the
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amount of workload and stress experienced by the crew. These differences included the
presence of heavy electronic jamming, the anxiety of performance pressure induced by
the OPEVAL, and other variables such as fatigue, motion sickness, real and simulated
equipment failures, and in the case of MR-MAX, the relative size of the incoming raid.
3. MISSILE-RAID
The third workload category was induced by live missile firings. The two
events of this category, MF-4E and MF-7, were live fire exercises at multiple air targets.
Both scenarios presented the CIC team with challenging and realistic engagement
geometries. Workload would almost certainly be greater than that of the normal watch
period (NO-RAID- 1 and NO-RAID-2) and probably greater than that of the MANNED-
RAID category. Although most, if not all, of the same factors that contributed to high
levels of workload and stress in the MANNED-RAID scenarios were present in the live
fire exercises, there were at least two factors that could limit the level of stress compared
to actual combat. They were (a) the constraints imposed by range safety considerations
and (b) the ability of the CIC team to deduce the threat axis by knowing the physical
limits of the missile test range.
B. INDICES OF WORKLOAD
The analysis of communication patterns during these raids included three
quantitative measures. These measures, which will be discussed below, were Mean
Transmission Time (MTT), Speech to Pause Ratio (SPR), and Speech Time to Total
Time Ratio (ST/TT). These three measures were derived from a simple observation
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which was defined as the duration of a verbal utterance on the communication network,
measured in seconds, by any CIC team member.
1. Mean Transmission Time (MTT)
Mean Transmission Time is the average duration of voice transmissions from
the CIC team during each simulated raid. It provided a convenient measure of the
typical length of vocal transmissions by CIC team members under varying levels of
workload.
2. Speech-to-Pause Ratio (SPR)
The Speech-to-Pause Ratio (SPR) is the ratio of the total Speaking Time (ST)
to the total Pause Time (PT). Speaking Time is the sum of all transmission times on the
network over the raid. Since simultaneous transmissions by more than one team member
cannot occur on the network, ST cannot exceed the duration of the raid. Pause Time is
the sum of the times during which no transmissions or keying of a transmitter was
detected.
Total Time (IT) was measured in minutes, hence, the need to divide the
product of the number of transmissions and MTT by 60 to achieve a like unit of
measurement for ST. The relationship between Speaking Time and Pause Time and then-













TT = TOTAL TIME OF THE RAID (MINUTES)
3. Speech-Time-to-Total-Time (ST/TT) Ratio
The Speech-Time-to-Total-Time Ratio (ST/TT) is the ratio of the amount of
time in which speech occurred to the length of the entire raid measured in minutes. This
measure highlighted the total speech time during a given raid against the total elapsed
time of the raid. This ratio is related to SPR, but, in fact, is different. SPR compares
the Speech Time to the Pause Time, while ST/TT compares the Speech Time to the Total
Time of the raid.
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C. DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE
COMOPTEVFOR directed that only unobtrusive, noninvasive methods could be
used to collect data. Therefore, audio taps were installed on Internal Communications
Net 15 and used to record voice transmissions between CIC team members during the
two NORAID episodes and six subsequent Component Raid scenarios. Internal
Communications Net 15 aboard AEGIS combatants is the primary means by which
members of CIC coordinate tactical employment of the ship. Naval Warfare Analysis
Center (NWAC) time stamped the data collected to enable synchronized post-event
reconstruction of the CIC team's voice communications. (NRaD, 1992, pp. 9-10)
D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
This section on statistical analysis is presented in two parts. The first part
discusses the actual data and the adjustments made to it to account for unplanned events
during various raids. The second part discusses the scaling technique employed to
provide a basis to rank order the various raids in terms of increasing workload.
1. Data
NRaD compiled written transcripts of voice communications from the audio
tapes taken during DDG 51 OPEVAL. The length of each transmission (in seconds) was
recorded during the transcription process. These individual transmission times were
entered into a commercial computer statistical software package, STATGRAPHICS, for
exploratory data analysis. They were entered two ways. The first format treated data
from each of the eight Component Raids individually; for example MR-3, MR-MAX,
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MF-7, etc. The second format collapsed across these specific raids to produce the three
Composite Raid categories: NO-RAID, MANNED-RAID, and MISSILE-RAID. The
positions on the CIC watch teams were occupied by the same operators for all raids. An
exception to this was the Commanding Officer's presence during all of the missile firing
events.
There were two other irregularities in the data. First, two raids in the
MANNED-RAID data (MR-3 and MR-MAX) each had an unusually long transmission
burst; 30 and 23 seconds, respectively. These transmissions were deleted because their
content was atypical: they contained miscellaneous discussions that did not pertain to the
current operational environment.
Likewise, the longest transmission was deleted from two raids in the
MISSILE-RAID data (MF-4E and MF-7). In these two transmissions, a 24 and 33
second burst respectively, the content dealt with range safety procedures, an unavoidable
artificiality made for safety considerations.
2. Tests
a. Tests of Significant Differences
Preliminary screening to determine if there was a statistical difference
between the distributions of transmission times across the Composite Raids was
accomplished using a Chi-Squared test for homogeneity. The null hypothesis was stated
as follows:
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Hq: The lengths of verbal utterances during the Composite Raids (NO-RAID,
MANNED-RAID, and MISSILE-RAID) are the same.
The k-sample problem for a categorical variable is the problem of testing
whether the distributions of the variable are the same for k populations, based on
independent random samples from each population. As stated previously, the chi-square
test for homogeneity is the appropriate statistical procedure for this purpose and has the
following form:
Eij
where the summation is over all cells in the two-way table, O^ represents the observed
frequency for the ijth category of the variable, and E^ represents the expected frequency
of the variable. E^ is the row total multiplied by the column total for the same row and
column divided by the grand total. The chi-square test will be based on the rule,
Reject H :x 2 *c ,
where the cut-off value c is to be determined to control the type I error probability to the
value specified by the preassigned ^nificance level a. The chi-square distribution is
indexed by an integer-valued parameter called the degrees of freedom. The degrees of
freedom equal the number of rows in the table minus one times the number of columns
minus one. (Koopmans, 1987, pp. 412-415)
The Kolmogorov - Smirnov two-sample test was used to verify the results
of the chi-squared test for a pair-wise comparison of the Composite Raids. The
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test evaluates overall goodness-of-fit to determine whether two
samples may reasonably have come from the same distribution. The procedure requires
calculating the maximum vertical distance between the cumulative distribution functions
(CDF's) of two samples. If the distance is large enough, the hypothesis that two samples
come from the same distribution is rejected.
b. Subjective Workload Level
Before the OPEVAL, operational subject matter experts and behavioral
researchers from OPTEVFOR and NRaD determined that in terms of workload, the
raids, from lowest to highest, ranked as follows: NO-RAID, MANNED-RAID, and
MISSILE-RAID. Except for MR-MAX, there was no attempt to predict how the
Component Raids which comprised these three Composite Raids would rank within each
category. For MR-MAX, the judges held that workload levels should rank closer to the
missile firing events simply because of the size of the raid. After compiling summary
statistics and deriving temporal measures for each Component Raid, the Component
Raids were ranked according to the temporal measures. The rationale to rank the
Component Raids by these criteria was straightforward: if each of the measures of
communication patterns actually tapped into workload, then the rank order of the
Component Raids made on the basis of these measures should be the same.
The Component Raids were ranked three ways. First, they were ranked
by increasing magnitudes of the ST/TT ratio and the SPR; and second, they were ranked
by decreasing magnitude of MTT. However, since these two criteria produced different
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rankings of workload 1
,
a third ranking was done to determine which criterion most
accurately reflected workload. A subjective scaling method, scaling by magnitude
estimation, was selected to produce the third set of workload rankings.
This scaling hod required subject matter experts to mark a point on
a line that corresponded to the subjective magnitude of the dimension being rated, in this
case, workload. The subject matter experts were ten Surface Warfare qualified
Lieutenants. Respondents were given two reference points on which to rank the seven
Component Raids. The low workload reference point was based on independent
operation of a ship during peacetime. The high workload reference point was based on
carrier battle group operations during a wartime footing. The reference points were
events not included in the Component Raids being rated in order to produce clear
agreement as to the rank of those references. The scale's unit of measurement is totally
arbitrary, but by providing two reference points, an interval scale is implied because both
a scale and an origin are determined. (Zatkin, 1983, pp. 1-6) APPENDIX A contains
the test questionnaire.
1 The differences in Component Raids will be discussed in Chapter TV.
30
m. RESULTS
The results of the analysis on communication patterns will be presented in two
parts. The first part considers the three temporal measures of frequency and duration of
verbal transmissions (MTT, SPR, and ST/TT). The second part submits these measures
to statistical analyses and rates the relative workload attributed to each scenario on a
subjective basis. Both sections treat the data on the three Composite Raid scenarios (NO-
RAID, MANNED-RAID, and MISSILE-RAID) first, then breaks those scenarios into
their Component Raids; that is, NO-RAID- 1, NO-RAID-2, MR-3, MR-11, MR- 12, MR-
MAX, MF-7, and MF-4E.
A. TEMPORAL MEASUREMENTS
1. Composite Raids
TABLE 1 shows the results of the temporal measures taken when DDG 5
1
communication data was grouped by NO-RAID, MANNED-RAID, and MISSILE-RAID;
that is, when Component Raids (MR-3, MR-1 1 , and so forth) were collapsed to form the
three Composite Raid scenarios. The last column of TABLE 1, labeled COMBINED,
shows the temporal measures collapsed across all Composite Raids. Figure 3 shows the
trends in the temporal measures across the three Composite Raid scenarios as a function
of increasing workload.
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TABLE 1 TEMPORAL MEASURES FROM COMPOSITE RAIDS
NORAID MANRAID MISSILE COMBINED
n 305 1808 651 2764
MTT
(SEC)
2.92 2.73 2.54 2.71
a
1 7.37 4.54 3.85 4.70
a 2.71 2.13 1.96 2.17
ST
(MIN)
14.8 82.3 27.6 124.8
TT
(MIN)
75.0 265.6 81.6 422.2
ST/TT .20 .31 .34 .30

















Figure 3. Composite Raid Trends
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2. Component Raids
TABLE 2 shows the temporal measures from each Component Raid. Figure
4 decomposes the three Composite Raid scenarios into their Component Raids and rank
orders the Component Raids according to increasing magnitudes of SPR and ST/TT ratio.
Figure 5 rank orders these same scenarios by decreasing magnitude of MTT. These
ranking criteria, and the rational for their use were discussed in the previous chapter.
For simplicity, the NO-RAID- 1 and NO-RAID-2 events were combined to provide a
baseline reference point.
TABLE 2 TEMPORAL MEASURES FROM COMPONENT RAIDS
NORAID MR3 MRU MR12 MRMAX MF4E MF7
n 305 217 696 400 495 325 326
MTT 2.92 2.85 2.79 2.72 2.62 2.36 2.72
o
2 7.37 4.90 4.43 4.67 4.43 3.69 3.96
a 2.71 2.21 2.10 2.16 2.10 1.92 1.99
ST
(MIN)
14.8 10.3 32.4 18.1 21.6 12.8 14.8
TT
(MIN)
75.0 41.2 93.1 60.0 71.3 38.0 43.6
ST/TT .20 .25 .35 .30 .31 .34 .34
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Figure 5. Rankings Based On Mean Transmission Time
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B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
1. Composite Raid Analysis
The null hypothesis that the lengths of verbal utterances were the same during
each of the three Composite Raid categories was rejected by the chi-square test for
homogeneity (-X2 = 27.7; df = 12; p < 0.01). The three Kolmogorov-Smirnov two
sample tests performed on each different pairing of the three Composite Raids also
produced significant differences at a = 0.01 . The duration of verbal utterances collected
during the three Composite Raid groupings (NO-RAID, MANNED-RAID, and
MISSILE-RAID) came from statistically different distributions. Figure 6 depicts these
three distributions.
2. Component Raid Analysis
TABLE 3 shows the results of the subject matter experts' ranking of the
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Figure 6. Composite Raid Cumulative Distributions
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TABLE 3 SUBJECTIVE RANKINGS OF COMPONENT RAIDS
Ss NORAID MR3 MRU MR12 MRMAX MF4E MF7
1 54 98 119 110 87 122 81
2 28 33 69 142 53 130 40
3 20 48 141 116 137 153 149
4 28 143 157 164 174 104 143
5 10 45 150 90 137 62 114
6 26 52 72 78 75 34 31
7 32 75 145 110 49 63 122
8 39 83 133 128 120 100 125
9 12 95 123 131 145 31 75
10 11 73 110 115 100 114 120
MEAN 26 75 122 118 108 91 100
RANK 7 6 1 2 3 5 4
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IV. DISCUSSION
The data revealed that the measures derived from communications between CIC
team members during simulated Composite Raids showed systematic quantitative
differences as a function of varying workload levels. The data also revealed, however,
that when these Composite Raids were decomposed into their Component Raids, the
relative ranking of workload reflected by each Component Raid varied as a function of
the temporal measure or subjective scale values chosen as the criterion for the workload
ranking. Different ranking criteria produced different workload rankings for the
Component Raids. This chapter will discuss three themes: (a) the general finding from
the Composite Raid data, (b) the inconsistencies in the Component Raid ranking data,
and (c) a comparison of findings from other related studies.
A. FINDINGS
1. Composite Raid
Figure 3 shows the temporal measures plotted against the three Composite
Raid scenarios. The data show that communication patterns among CIC team members
were significantly altered as a function of increasing workload. Based on the assumption
that there is a monotonic increasing level of workload associated with the NO-RAID,
MANNED-RAID, and MISSILE-RAID scenarios, the temporal measures followed the
same monotonic relationship; that is, as workload increased, two of the measures, SPR
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and ST/TT ratio, also increased, and one, MTT, decreased. This finding substantiates
that there were, in fact, quantitative differences in communication patterns and that the
temporal measures systematically varied as a function of workload imposed on the CIC
team.
Simply stated, Figure 3 shows that as workload increased, the frequency of
transmissions also increased, but the duration of transmissions decreased. Moreover, as
TABLE 1 revealed, as Mean Transmission Time decreased with increasing workload, the
variability of transmission length also decreased. The variability of SPR and ST/TT
decreased with increasing workload, simply because Mean Transmission Time was used
to derive these two measures.
2. Component Raids
Figures 4 and 5 show the rank order of the seven Component Raids ranked
as a function of two different criteria. In Figure 4, the Component Raids were rank
ordered according to increasing SPR and increasing ST/TT ratio. In Figure 5, the
Component Raids were rank ordered according to decreasing Mean Transmission Time.
As noted in the previous section, the two sets of rankings of relative workload made on
the basis of these two candidate measures of workload are not the same.
a. Workload Rankings
The three Composite Raid scenarios were logically ordered according to
increasing workload; that is, NO-RAID imposed the lowest level of workload and
MISSILE-RAID imposed the highest level. As Figure 3 shows, the temporal measures
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track this workload ordering. In a very rigorous sense, one would expect the same
relative order to hold among the Component Raids when they are decomposed from the
Composite Raids. However, as reported above, that order was not invariably retained.
When decomposed, there were minor transpositions in the rank order of workload
associated with the seven Component Raids depending upon the criterion used for the
ordering.
Inspecting the three criteria (MTT, SPR and ST/TT ratio, and subjective
rankings) used to rank workload of the Component Raids, reveals that MR-3 and NO-
RAID consistently ranked sixth and seventh, respectively; the lowest workload levels on
the scale. Of the five remaining Component Raids, MR- 11 ranked at the top when
ranked by subject matter experts and also when SPR and ST/TT ratio were used as the
criteria. MF-7, MF-4E, and MR-MAX ranked high on workload when temporal
measures were used as the criterion, but not as high when they were ranked by subject
matter experts. This transposition of relative position in workload ranking provided by
the subject matter experts could be attributed to a combination of the scenario
descriptions provided in the scaling survey and the subjective interpretation of them by
the respondents.
The minor inconsistencies and transpositions in the relative workload
rankings of the Component Raids has a straightforward explanation. The raids' unique
characteristics and conditions, which clearly contributed variability, were suppressed
when the data were collapsed into the three Composite Raid scenarios. These conditions
and characteristics included unique environmental conditions, unplanned or imposed
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equipment failures, uncertain tactical picture, and varying levels of workload within a
Component Raid. Given the constraints imposed on experimental rigor by the
operational situation associated with an OPEVAL, however, the central thesis still holds:
there are, in fact, systematic quantitative changes in communications patterns among CIC
team members as a function of increased workload.
B. COMPARISON TO NRaD FINDINGS
NRaD was the lead test agent for the stress analysis portion of DDG 51's
OPEVAL. Their three methodologies for measuring stress were considerably different
than the one explored in this thesis. As previously discussed, NRaD used subjective
workload assessments from CIC watchstanders, subjective assessments of performance
pressure by experts observing video and audio tape recordings of the CIC team, and
objective measures of workload using console use patterns reconstructed from onboard
computers.
A comparison of the results from the NRaD measurement approach and the present
approach serves three purposes.
• If the two independent approaches produce similar conclusions, then the validity
of the general finding that stress affected operator performance in DDG 51 's
OPEVAL is increased.
• The original objective of both studies was to demonstrate that stress was present
and measurable in the OPEVAL. If the two methods meet that objective, then both
can be considered reliable starting points for future use in TADMUS field
experiments.
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• If the analyses produce dissimilar conclusions, then either one or both methods
could be considered insensitive to changes in workload induced by the OPEVAL.
Any outcome would renew efforts to resolve the difficult methodological task of
unobtrusively measuring workload in an operational setting.
According to their subjective analyses of the simulated raids, NRaD concluded that
there were "... no overt indications of excessive individual or team workload or
performance pressure stress." This conclusion was caveated by reporting that ". . .it
was clear that periods of medium workload intensity and short periods of high intensity
occurred in the CIC." (NRaD 1992, p. 18)
The NRaD report did not specifically name the Component Raids which exhibited
medium or high intensity workload. However, the Component Raids that NRaD did
report three or more times as exhibiting noteworthy error rates, response times, and
objective workload were MR-1 1 , MF-4E, MF-7, and MR-MAX. Figure 3 of the present
study identifies the same four events as having the greatest amount of workload compared
to the baseline NORAID events. The difference between the NRaD approach and the
present approach is that while both methods produced similar conclusions, the measures
used to substantiate these conclusions were different. NRaD determined relative
workload principally by subjective means, while the present study determined the same
relative workload by an analysis of human communication patterns.
The two studies together underscore the fact that DDG 51's CIC team experienced
periods of medium to high intensity workload and that these periods occurred in at least
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four of the six raids. Moreover, these events were predicted to produce the highest
levels of workload during the OPEVAL and were designed consistent with the policy of
stressing human operators as well as the machine. Considering data was collected on
only eight scenarios, two of which were considered baseline measures (NO-RAID), the
NRaD and the present study could provide a potentially productive point of departure for
further research into the measurement of workload.
C. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
One of the few studies that used temporal aspects of verbal communications
patterns to assess the impact of stress upon those patterns was conducted by Hicks
(1979). The investigation examined both laboratory induced stress (electrical shock
administered randomly while subjects read a passage) and situational stress
(undergraduate students delivering speeches to an audience). Besides acoustical
measures, which will not be considered here, Hicks' analysis derived two of the three
temporal measures used in the present study; that is, SPR and the ST/TT Ratio. The
third measure used by Hicks was Speech Rate. (Hicks, 1979, pp. xviii-xix)
Speech Rate is not equivalent to the present study's Mean Transmission Time.
Hicks defined Speech Rate as the number of syllables produced per second. The present
study defined Mean Transmission Time as the average duration of discrete verbal
transmissions over the entire combat simulation.
Hicks' findings showed that speech produced under stressful conditions exhibited
quantitatively different temporal patterns than speech produced under non-stressful
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conditions. The situational stress experiment revealed that SPR and ST/TT increased and
Speech Rate decreased. The increased SPR and ST/TT measures were significant (p <
0.05). The decrease in Speech Rate was not statistically significant at a = 0.05. Hicks
concluded that stress tends to decrease Speech Rate and the number of speech bursts and
pauses, which results in longer continuous speech periods. Simply stated, Hicks found
that subjects in his situational experiments communicated slower and their verbal
utterances were longer. (Hicks, 1979, pp. xix-xx)
Hicks' findings seem contrary to the present study's findings, but there are three
plausible explanations for the apparent contradiction. First, Hicks' experiments did not
analyze communication patterns elicited from a team. He analyzed communication
patterns from individual speakers. Second, Hicks neither imposed multiple tasks on his
subjects which required them to allocate their attentional resources across those tasks, nor
did he tax their short term memory capacities. He simply had his subjects perform one
task. Third, Hicks' subjects were not trained to use a highly disciplined, highly codified
tactical language. His subjects were free to use any style and any rhetoric in their speech
to their peers.
Despite the differences between Hicks' findings and the present study's findings,
two central findings stand out. First, communication patterns from both individuals and
teams tend to show quantitative changes as a function of stress. Second, these changes
seem to be temporal in nature; that is, the frequency and duration of verbal transmissions
with which humans communicate are affected by workload and its associated level of
stress.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The present study's findings stem from quantitative analyses of the 2,700 verbal
transmissions made by members of DDG 51 's CIC team while they were exposed to
different levels of workload during their ship's OPEVAL. The Composite Raid data
produced the clearest findings: as workload increased, the frequency of transmissions
increased while the duration of transmissions decreased. There were more transmission
per unit time, but the transmissions were shorter.
When the Composite Raids were decomposed into their Component Raids, and
those Component Raids were ranked according to increasing or decreasing magnitudes
of the temporal measures, the rank order of the raids tracked reasonably well with three
other independent workload rankings of the same raids. The three different rankings
were made by (a) a sample of Surface Warfare qualified officers, (b) operational experts
at OPTEVFOR, and (c) behavioral researchers at NRaD. There was, therefore,
convergent validity; that is, different rankings based on different criteria, including the
temporal measures, produced like rank orderings of workload associated with the
Component Raids.
Finally, when the present study's findings were compared to an open literature
study of temporal measures in voice communication and stress, the comparison produced
seemingly contradictory results. While the present study showed that verbal
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transmissions were more frequent, but shorter, the open literature study showed just the
opposite: transmission bursts were less frequent, but longer in duration. The apparent
contradiction probably derives from very dissimilar experimental conditions; that is, each
study's subjects performed very different tasks that imposed significantly different
cognitive demands. Despite the apparent contradict ~ndings, however, both studies
did, in fact, show that communication patterns are affected by stress and that these
changes are quantifiable.
Workload and stress effect changes in human communication patterns. That
finding, which in the present study is based on naturalistic observations collected by
unobtrusive, noninvasive means; that is, recording human speech, provides a basis for
further research into first, the isolation of these patterns; and second, demonstrating that
they are reliable and valid indices of workload and stress.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress directed that research into stress in team coordination be conducted to
prevent tragedies similar to the 1988 VINCENNES incident. DDG 51's OPEVAL was
the first OPEVAL that used findings from the TADMUS research project. There are
four important lessons learned.
1. Experimental Realism
Laboratory experiments must be more realistic. They must closely mirror the
environment which they purport to model. Laboratory experiments, while
methodologically rigorous and tightly controlled, typically do not produce findings that
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are easily generalizable to the operational environment. These experiments will continue
to produce critically needed information, but they must not be considered ends in
themselves. Sailors operating complex equipment on a daily basis at sea could provide
invaluable information to behavioral researchers. The DDG 51 OPEVAL should mark
the beginning of a regular series of operational opportunities to verify the methods and
results produced by laboratory experiments.
2. Front-End Planning
Because defense budget is shrinking, workload data must be extracted from
the precious few opportunities available to gather it. An OPEVAL is a reasonable time
to gather workload data provided adequate planning and operationally acceptable
performance measures are considered early in its test plan development. Unobtrusively
collecting performance data from which reliable estimates of workload could be later
derived should be considered at the very beginning of the test plan development and not
be included as an after thought. OPTEVFOR must be complimented for their efforts to
incorporate this "first of its kind" data collection evolution into such a detailed test plan
on short notice.
3. Human Factors in System Design
The Surface Warfare community needs to follow Naval Aviation's outlook on
the importance of human factors in system design. With the advent of more complex
combat systems in the surface community, the community should increasingly attend to
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the broad range of human factor requirements necessary to accommodate the increasing
complexity and the demands it imposes in the human operator and maintained
4. Application
As applied to analysis of internal communications, at least two areas are
recommended for further review.
• Although still in an experimental stage, voice stress analysis could provide an
insight to and/or verification of methods analyzed in this study.
• Communication data from inport team trainers, fleet exercises, and actual combat
events; for example, the tapes from USS VINCENNES, should be analyzed to
produce reference points on a line representing stress effects on CIC team
communications. This reference line could be used in future team trainer design
as a gauge for evaluating the presence and amount of stress.
C. SUMMARY
It is important to note that an analysis of communications from a CIC team exposed
to different levels of workload has never been conducted in an operational test
environment and the findings must be considered tentative. This study, however,
probably would have been further delayed had not the VINCENNES incident occurred
and Congressional pressure been applied.
The motivation notwithstanding, as advances in technology increase naval combat
system complexity, the chances of catastrophic error also increases dramatically. In the
past, the air arm of the U.S. Navy has lead the way in human factors related research
because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of mistakes in the cockpit of
advanced jet aircraft. With the advent of AEGIS, New Threat Upgrade, and the
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extended ranges and lethality of surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and surface-to-
subsurface weapons, it is paramount that the Surface Warfare Community attend to the
human interfaces to these devastating weapon systems, and the human information
processing requirements that support them. The Navy is at a crossroads with respect to
downsizing and decreasing budgets, but if this area of study is neglected, events such as
what occurred in the Persian Gulf will become more commonplace and more tragic as
technology outpaces the ability of man to control it.
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APPENDIX A
MAGNITUDE ESTIMATION OF EXERCISE SCENARIOS
Please rate the following seven scenarios according to the amount of workload you would
expect to experience as part of a CIC team in an AAW ship. The two points on the line
are provided as reference points for your convenience.
Mark your selection with the appropriate abbreviation from the list of scenarios on
the following page. Place your selection ABOVE the line and draw an arrow to the
point on the line where you would like it to appear. You do not have to rate all the
scenarios. If you are unfamiliar with a scenario, feel free to ignore it and move on.
CONDITION 4 CONDITION 3




MF4E. MISSILE EXERCISE (Firing event). No other ships in company. Approximate
launch time known with threat sector of 90 degrees. Heavy jamming and chaff present.
Eight targets presented and 16 Standard Missiles (SM-2) available to counter. Targets
are air and surfaced launched drones and anti-ship missiles at varying altitudes and
speeds. CPA times are within thirty seconds.
NORAID. UNDERWAY WATCH. Steaming in company of FFG during multi-threat
exercise. HF data link established. No known contacts of interest. Helo ops scheduled
within 30 minutes.
MRU. MULTI-THREAT EXERCISE. Steaming in company of FFG. Weather
deteriorating rapidly. Events in exercise include: heavy airborne jamming and chaff
corridors, six attack aircraft simulating attacks, simulated loss of weapon control system,
possible submarine contact in area, and simulated TASM strike in progress on
constructive Kirov.
MR3. MULTI-THREAT EXERCISE. Steaming in company of FFG. Data link
established and FFG reporting its helo has gained contact on a submarine (outside enemy
attack range). Four aircraft attacking with no jamming support.
MRMAX. AAW EXERCISE. Steaming independently. Heavy jamming and chaff
present. Threat consists of a 50-60 manned aircraft stream raid at varying directions,
altitudes and speeds. Ship is using decoys and high speed maneuvering.
MF7. MISSILE EXERCISE (Firing event). No other ships in company. Approximate
launched time known. Heavy jamming and chaff present. Targets consist of two high
speed, high altitude air launched drones and one unmanned aircraft. Targets' CPA time
very close to simultaneous.
MR12. MULTI-THREAT EXERCISE. Steaming in company of FFG and controlling
P3C. Data link established. Hostile submarine in area and unlocated. Weather
deteriorating rapidly. Multiple, but spaced, three aircraft raids with medium airborne
jamming and chaff. Simulated TASM strike in progress on constructive Kirov.
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